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Culture has been either neglected as a determinant of economic growth by 
economicist theories or deemed the main explanation behind international 
developmental differences by culturalist theses. Empirical evidence supports neither 
of these arguments. Less ambitious theories connecting concrete cultural aspects, such 
as trust and associational participation in communities, have more convincingly 
estimated a significant and positive impact on economic welfare. Using the case of 
Honduras, this paper similarly estimates a positive, significant and mutual relation 
between interpersonal trust and participation in community management and 
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   1 INTRODUCTION 
After decades of neglect, there is now a growing interest in the role that 
culture plays in developmental processes. Standard economic modelling has been 
extended to include social, political and cultural variables to account for economic 
growth. International financial institutions have started to draft (admittedly modest) 
agendas for cultural development. These agendas recognise several developmental 
aspects, from the economic potential of culture in the tourism industry to the virtues 
of a participatory culture promoting community cohesion. Governments have also 
grown more sensitive to the role that culture may play in the context of development. 
Recent poverty reduction strategies of the highly indebted poor countries explicitly 
link – nominally at least – national development with cultural and moral values.   
Arguments which prioritise culture as a prominent development factor are not 
new. Early in the twentieth century, Max Weber raised awareness of the importance 
of a set of values to explain the success of industrial capitalism vis-à-vis pre-capitalist 
agrarian societies across Europe (Weber 1905). From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, 
however, the ‘hard’ economic reality of stabilisation and structural adjustment 
packages elbowed cultural aspects out of development agendas. Since the 1990s, both 
the paradigm of human development and passionate discussions on globalisation has 
revived interest in the role of culture in economic development. The myopic approach 
of many analyses has contributed to a heated debate. ‘One-size-fits-all’ culturalist 
(and economicist) analyses attempt to explain development by turning a handful of 
historical episodes into universal paradigms. Unsurprisingly, empirical evidence does 
not support such claims.   
Less ambitious analyses have more successfully shown that concrete cultural 
mechanisms have a positive and significant impact on economic development. This 
paper adds to this limited stock of empirical evidence. The first part of the paper 
presents a critical review of developmental paradigms and the role attributed to 
culture. Arguments are divided into two categories: those ‘on the fringes’ which deal 
with an overarching concept of culture; and other, less ambitious arguments which 
emphasise specific values and behaviours in society. Crucially, the latter provide 
empirical evidence that trust, civism and community participation can have significant 
impacts on economic welfare. The second half of the paper considers the case study 
of Honduras and estimates, country-wide, the impact of trust and community 
management participation on household welfare. The results show a strong positive, 
  1significant and simultaneous relation between a composite of interpersonal trust and 
community management, and household welfare.    
 
 
2  CULTURAL ASPECTS ‘ON THE FRINGES’: FROM ‘ECONOMICIST’ 
TO ‘CULTURALIST’ THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT   
Although cultural development as an objective of broader development has 
only recently been recognised, culture – widely understood as a system of values, 
beliefs and behaviours present in a society (Sen 2004) – has long been recognised as a 
determinant of economic development. The relevance that has been attributed to it has 
varied widely, however, from neglect at one end of the spectrum to culture being 
treated as the over-arching cause of global developmental differences, at the other 
end. Early work within the exogenous growth paradigm, for example, completely 
failed to connect economic and non-economic aspects. It is as if – to quote Fukuyama 
(1995: 6) – ‘the economy is a realm in which individuals … satisfy their selfish needs 
and desires before retreating back into their “real” social lives’. Nurkse (1953), Lewis 
(1955) and Solow (1956), among others, recognised only the logic of the market for 
competitive capital accumulation. During the mid-1980s, however, growth theory 
started to reject the idea of capricious technological development as the basis for 
long-term growth. A first wave of models of so-called endogenous growth (Lucas 
1988; Romer 1990; Barro 1991) put forward a new concept of capital, extending the 
traditional ideas of physical and financial capital to include human capital. Economic 
growth had abandoned the strait-jacket of diminishing returns (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995: 13). New factors such as research and development, imperfect 
competition, information asymmetries, externalities, and technological diffusion all 
became important, as did public action, especially fiscal policy, provision of 
infrastructure, and intellectual property, commercial and financial regulation. In spite 
of these shifts, however, cultural aspects remained peripheral, outside the roots of 
long-term economic growth.  
In contrast with capital accumulation theories – classical or augmented – other 
theories have talked of specific cultural aspects or of culture more generally, as the 
fundamental determinant of economic development. Some have used culture to 
explain past successes, while others concentrate on conditions for future development. 
Landes’s explanation of early industrialisation in Europe and in England particularly, 
  2emphasises ‘nonmaterial values (culture)’ and institutions (Landes 1998: 215) in 
conjunction with the institutionalisation of technological advance.  According to 
Landes, the fact that England at that time was a nation with a strong sense of identity 
and a precocious inclination for political and civil freedom and the security of its 
people put it in a better position to embrace technological and economic development 
than Islamic and Chinese societies.
1
 More contemporary approaches, such as that of 
Porter (1990), focus on rapid and sustained productivity growth as the cornerstone of 
economic development in a global world. His ‘competition paradigm’ argues that 
productivity depends not so much on the industries with which a nation competes 
internationally, but how this nation competes. And national culture plays a significant 
role in a nation’s capacity to organise its production efficiently. As the globalisation 
process neutralises former economic advantages associated with geographical location 
and endowments and traditional barriers, values promoting competitiveness become 
increasingly decisive. Furthermore, Porter (2000) concludes that the adoption of this 
competition culture is not an option but an imperative within the current global 
context.   
Of course, other authors disagree with the contention that global market-
oriented processes are imperative and unstoppable, while still considering cultural 
aspects as determinants of economic development. Chang and Grabel (2004) recently 
argued that the ‘no-alternative’ view of free market neoliberal globalisation is a 
fallacious myth. They also reject the notion that the East Asian development model is 
culturally idiosyncratic and could not be reproduced elsewhere, as much as they reject 
the idea that the Anglo-American neoliberal model is based on universal values. 
Unfortunately, they do not provide a yardstick with which to judge universalism 
which would strengthen their arguments. On a different note, Chua (2003) argues that 
the current process of economic liberalisation has magnified opportunities across the 
world for ‘market dominant’ ethnic minorities to concentrate disproportionate wealth 
in local economies.
2 When this process is followed by disorderly and hasty Western-
                                                 
1 Material factors also played a role in the English success in early industrialisation. Landes identifies 
the purchasing power of the lower classes and the wealth of the middle classes as a key factor in the 
demand for industrialised production.   
2 Examples of this phenomenon abound in developing countries: the Chinese minority in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand; the Lebanese in Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania; the Whites in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in Africa, or in Guatemala, Ecuador or Bolivia in Latin America; the Jews in post-
Communist Russia; the Hutus in Rwanda, the Ibo in Nigeria and the Kikuyu in Kenya.   
  3pushed democratic liberalisation, the resentment of local majorities prompts the spiral 
of confrontation seen in places such as Indonesia, Zimbabwe or Bolivia. Although 
there is no unique reason for minorities to thrive economically, Chua concedes that 
part of this success is due to ‘culture/family networks’. Disappointingly, the extent to 
which these networks are responsible for that success as compared to entrepreneurial 
values, alliances with autocratic elites (‘crony capitalism’) or colonial practices, for 
example, is not clarified.     
Other ‘culturalist’ explanations have gone much further. They constitute what 
Sen (2000: 11) calls ‘over-grand’ cultural theories. They maintain that culture is the 
main single factor explaining worldwide economic, political and social differences. 
Huntington’s thesis of clashing civilisations, in which individuals no longer identify 
themselves along ideological lines but as part of cultural groups, is well known. 
Huntington (1993) predicts that, as a result, economic globalisation will lead to a 
ferocious competition among civilisations and a protracted confrontation among the 
most prominent cultures. He envisages that economic competition without cultural 
convergence will dominate future world relations. Confrontation between democratic, 
communist and fascist regimes has been replaced by Western, Islamic, Confucian 
(and other) culture clashes. A frequent critique of this thesis, however, is that 
traditional civilisations are bound to conflict. There are, after all, at least as many 
examples in history of civilisations collapsing at the hands of others, as there are of 
successful episodes of cooperation among them.   
Another well-known culturalist position is Max Weber’s thesis that the 
hegemony of capitalism is a cultural phenomenon associated with religion. 
Protestantism, or more specifically Calvinism, would have facilitated in Europe the 
adoption of a modern industrial capitalism seeking wealth accumulation. Calvinism is 
believed to advocate an ethical code of individual behaviour conducive to economic 
success based on hard work, honesty and a prudent use of time and resources. 
According to Landes (2000), Protestantism institutionalised a behavioural pattern of 
rational, diligent and productive work. Although this was neither new nor exclusive to 
this religion, it had not been systematically exercised in previous traditional 
agricultural societies. While these values spread widely along with the Protestant 
Reform in Central Europe, traditional values of obedience and religious faith 
remained in Southern Europe. That explains, according to Rao (1998), why decades 
of poorer economic performance ensued across Southern Europe. Similarly, 
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development is concerned. In his comparison of the development of Ghana and South 
Korea over the last forty years, Huntington claims that the two countries had similar 
per capita income levels, economic sectors and composition of exports in the early 
1960s. Thirty years later, South Korea was an industrial giant and the fourteenth 
largest world economy, and its per capita income levels were fifteen times higher than 
those of underdeveloped Ghana. Huntington attributes these divergent paths to 
different values prevalent in each society: South Korea championed values of saving, 
investment, hard work, discipline, organisation and learning, all absent in Ghana.   
There are numerous reasons to exercise great caution in the face of these 
‘over-grand’  culturalist theories. While they may explain specific episodes of 
development, they fail to clearly explain the international development experience 
following the Second World War. Sen (2004) is suspicious of the malleability of the 
original argument, moulded to account for the economic modernisation of European 
Catholic countries first; then Japan; later on, the Asian tigers; and more recently, 
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, India or China. Similarly, Weiss and Hobson 
(1995) remind us that the same revered Confucian ethics, to which culturalist theories 
attribute the success of East Asian countries, has been associated for centuries with 
stagnant economies. They also reject the implication that Confucianism encompasses 
a homogeneous ethics, an argument equally applicable to Christianity or Islamism. 
Instead, they argue that the choice of political arrangements such as strategic 
industrialisation guided by the State is behind the development success of the region.   
In any event, the recurrent swing from neglect to over-explanatory 
connections of culture and economic development seems to be grounded on 
arguments which fit only specific instances of success. They are systematically 
disappointing in explaining why the supposedly superior factors had failed to act in 
previous situations, and why they did not continue to act. Nor do they explain why 
‘successful’ values fail to prevent hiccups along the development process. In other 
words, culturalist arguments fail to explain the dynamics of economic development. 
Furthermore, they share with economicist views the same myopia of ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
stories of successful development. Neither does the empirical evidence seem to 
support arguments of superior cultures. Table 1 reports a comparative  analysis  of ten  
’miracles’  and  ‘disasters’  of   economic  growth   since  the  1960s,  using  Temple’s 
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TABLE 1
Socio-cultural characterisation of economic miracles and failures 
 
% annual GDP 
growth per 














I. Miracles   
Korea   6.1  30  Buddhism   0   No   Yes  
Botswana   5.9  125  Indigenous 
beliefs   51   British   No  
Hong Kong   5.8  26  Buddhism,  
Confucianism   2   British   Yes  
Taiwan   5.8    Buddhism   42   No   Yes  
Singapore   5.4  28  Buddhism,  
Islam   42   British   Yes  
Japan   5.2  9  Confucianism,  
Buddhism   1   No   Yes  
Malta   4.8  33  Catholicism   8   British   Yes  
Cyprus   4.4  25  Orthodox   35   British   Yes  
Seychelles   4.4  36  Catholicism   …   British   Yes  
Lesotho   4.4  137  Christianity *   22   British   No  
II. Disasters 
Ghana   -0.3  129  Christian *   71   British   Yes  
Venezuela   -0.5  69  Catholicism   11   Spanish   Yes  
Mozambique   -0.7  170 
Indigenous 
beliefs,   
Christianity *  
65   Portuguese   Yes  
Nicaragua   -0.7  121  Catholicism   18   Spanish   Yes  
Mauritania   -0.8  154  Islam   33   French   Yes  
Zambia   -0.8  163  Catholicism   82   British   No  
Mali   -1.0  172  Islam   78   French   No  
Madagascar   -1.3  149 
Indigenous 
beliefs,  
Christianity *  
6   French   Yes  
Chad   -1.7  165  Islam   69   French   No  
Guyana   -2.1   92  Christianity *   58   British   Yes  
Source:  CIA (2003), Mauro (1997), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Temple (1999), UNDP (2003a)  
Notes:  Human Development Index rankings refer to 2001 and are reported by the Human Development Report 2003 
(UNDP, 2003a); ethno-linguistic fragmentation by Mauro (1997); colonial history and predominant religion by Sala-i-
Martin (1997) and CIA (2003).   
* indicates that original sources do not specify the main faith within Christianity.    
 
(1999) classification of successful and failed experiences of economic growth. 
Indicators of human development, religion, ethno-linguistic fragmentation, colonial 
history, and geographical location are the variables used for comparison.
3
 Rates of 
growth of the product per worker determine which countries are categorised as 
economic successes and failures. This simple exercise shows that there are no 
systematic patterns between cultural, social and geographical characteristics and 
                                                 
3 The ethno-linguistic fragmentation index measures the probability of two ethnically and/or 
linguistically different individuals belonging to the same country. The maximum value of the index, 
100, indicates that all individuals in a country are ethnically or linguistically different, while 0 implies 
that all individuals belong to the same ethnic or linguistic group. Taylor and Hudson (1972) describe 
the methodology for constructing the index. 
  6economic performance. Countries that averaged the highest annual growth rates since 
1960 may fare worse than ‘failed’ countries in their human development index. This 
is the case for economically successful Botswana and Lesotho, and disastrous 
Venezuela. Neither is economic performance systematically associated with the 
degree of ethno-linguistic fragmentation, whether countries have been colonies in the 
past, or whether they are landlocked. In other words, one cannot hope that certain 
cultural, geographical and historical patterns will guarantee economic growth on their 
own. Nor does any culture seem a priori bound to economic failure.   
 
 
3  MOVING AWAY FROM THE FRINGES: CULTURAL ASPECTS AS 
RELEVANT FACTORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
Alternative arguments have burgeoned midway between economicist and 
culturalist explanations of economic development. These emphasise the impact that 
relations among individuals and between individuals and institutions have on several 
aspects of economic development. Social capital has become an increasingly 
influential concept that highlights the importance of values, beliefs and attitudes of a 
society in the growth of its economy. As with culture, social capital is an elusive 
concept and difficult to measure; as a consequence, a consensus on which 
mechanisms of social capital enhance economic growth has not yet been reached. 
Coleman (1990) uses ‘social capital’ to refer to those relations of authority, trust and 
allocation of rights that become norms in a society. Putnam (1993) emphasises bonds 
of belonging in groups, whether family-based or of a different nature. He argues that 
these relationships are positive for economic growth because they instil ‘habits of 
cooperation, solidarity and public service’ conducive to growth (Putnam 1993: 89-
90).   
Interestingly, Fukuyama distinguishes between social capital and what he calls 
‘spontaneous sociability’ (Fukuyama 1995: 27). Social capital is a capability that 
arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it. As such, social 
capital is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like religion, 
tradition or historical habit, and in contrast with other forms of capital, it cannot be 
acquired by a rational investment decision. Spontaneous sociability, on the other 
hand, is a subset of social capital and refers specifically to the capacity to form new 
associations and act cooperatively within these associations. Levels of trust ultimately 
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And they have important economic consequences. Fukuyama makes a compelling 
case for these economic impacts. Sociability and social capital in a society affect the 
nature of the organisations dominating its economy, either small family-related or 
large private business organisations. In low-trust economies, administrative rules and 
bureaucratic structures (that substitute for trust) constitute an implicit tax on economic 
activity and a transaction cost. Contrary to Porter’s (2000) arguments, small firms 
may not compete internationally in the same sectors as large companies. Large-scale 
capital-intensive industrial organisations sponsored by the State are arguably less 
efficiently managed than their private sector counterparts. Examples of ‘lean 
manufacturing’ (in which production is horizontal and communally organised) deny a 
trade-off between community and efficiency. Ultimately, it is not that low-trust 
countries cannot do well economically – recent examples of successful, low-trust 
economies include, for instance, Italy, France, Hong-Kong, Taiwan and China – but, 
Fukuyama argues, the nature of these economies means that they may continue to 
participate in very different economic sectors and never be able to replicate the 
development paths of high-trust societies such as Japan, the US, Germany, Sweden or 
Holland. How future markets and technology evolve will determine whether these 
countries will sustain long-run economic growth, but low levels of trust may harm 
their long-term growth potential.   
While Fukuyama’s case is certainly compelling, not everything that glistens in 
the story of social capital turns out to be gold. On the one hand, in spite of 
Fukuyama’s claims for the advantage of trust in periods of sudden shocks, high-trust 
built-in structures may also result in periods of protracted crisis in the same way as 
rigid regulations in low-trust countries. On the other hand, Olson (1982) argues that 
one of the features associated with higher levels of social capital, namely, 
associationism, tends to institutionalise rent-seeking, with a resulting loss of 
efficiency in the economy. Knack and Keefer (1997) conclude that the impact of 
associationism on economic growth is neither positive nor negative. What they find is 
that relationships of trust and collective civism in a society are strongly correlated 
with higher economic growth. Large stocks of social capital may reduce or eliminate 
disincentives to invest and substitute for institutions in underdeveloped judicial 
systems. They may also improve the provision of public services as the economic 
environment becomes more stable and credible. Social capital typically strengthens 
  8civic participation, which may result in higher demands for transparency and 
accountability in the public sector, ultimately promoting economic efficiency and 
growth. Empirically, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that the effects of trust and civism 
on economic growth rates for a sample of twenty nine countries between 1981 and 
1995 are significant and positive. Increases of 10 percent in constructed indexes of 
trust and civism may on average raise the annual rate of per capita GDP growth by 0.8 
percent and 0.675 percent, respectively. Also, there are strong effects on investment, 
as reported in table 2.       
Besides values and behaviours, political and institutional relations are also 
believed to be relevant for economic growth. Concepts such as ‘social infrastructure’ 
(Hall and Jones 1999), or ‘good governance’ (Kaufman et al. 1999; Islam and 
Montenegro 2002) are concerned with the way institutions work and their impact on 
economic relations. In as much as institutional functioning is both shaped by and 
expected to shape societies’ and communities’ behaviours and norms, it is also part of 
a cultural link with development. In this perspective, a country or a community is 
more favourably equipped for economic growth when its public policies generate trust 
among economic agents and enhance workers’ productivity, the accumulation of 
physical, human and financial capital, and the innovation and transfer of technology. 
Table 2 shows that the order of magnitude of such gains is not negligible.   
TABLE 2 
Potential gains from eliminating perceived corruption and increasing social capital and 
social infrastructure (selected studies) 
Average reported effect on:   
Index  Source 
Per capita GDP 
growth  (%) 
Investment over GDP 
Perception of corruption  Mauro (1997)  0.3-0.4 1.9-3.2 
Social capital: trust   Knack and Keefer (1997)   0.8  1.4 
Social capital:civism   Knack and Keefer (1997)   0.7  5.0 
Social infrastructure   Hall and Jones (1999)   4.4 - 5.4a  n.a. 
Note: Estimated effects report the change in per capita GDP growth and investment ratios caused by a 10% variation  
in the incumbent index. (a) Effects are estimated as change in GDP growth per worker. Hall and Jones (1999) results  
are estimated for a sample of 127 countries between 1960 and 1995. Mauro’s (1997) database consists of 58  
countries with complete information for the period between 1960 and 1985.   
 
In line with the results of multi-country studies, a few recent analyses have also found 
that participation in local associations (taken as proxy for social capital) has a positive 
impact on economic welfare. Studies by Grootaert (1999), Narayan and Pritchett 
(1999), Grootaert and Narayan (2001), and Grootaert et al. (2002) report a significant 
and positive relation between social capital and household welfare. Increases of 10 
  9percent in the level of social capital raise household expenditure per capita by around 
5. percent in communities of Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Bolivia and Indonesia. The 
estimated effects of social capital on economic welfare are larger than the effects of 
human capital. Unfortunately, these studies focus on a handful of communities and 
there is no confirmation of their findings at a national level. In the following section, 
relations between trust and participation in community management and economic 
welfare are estimated country-wide for Honduras.   
 
 
4  TRUST, PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT AND 
ECONOMIC WELFARE IN HONDURAS.    
4.1  Why Honduras?   
The recent history of Honduras has included an array of events affecting 
economic development and values, attitudes and behaviours simultaneously. In 
addition to the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch itself, in 1998, the post-Mitch 
reconstruction period demanded the local management of enormous international 
resource flows, and an unprecedented mobilization of communities, municipalities, 
NGOs and the private sector.
4
 The management of the reconstruction effort at the 
community level is widely acknowledged to have strengthened individuals’ trust in 
their communities, fellow citizens, and the international community (UNDP 2003b). 
Paradoxically, this contrasts with a generalised distrust in the national political and 
institutional establishment. Rápalo (2001) links this distrust with the unfinished 
transition towards a true participatory democracy. Latinobarómetro (Lagos 2001) 
reports that only 55 percent of Hondurans stated a preference for democracy over 
authoritarian regimes in 2001, whilst 60 percent were either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ 
dissatisfied with the functioning of their democracy in that year.
5 The view that 
politicians disrespect the law, pursue their own interests over national interests and do 
not have any concern for the poor is almost universal in the country. Unsurprisingly, 
the recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Government of Honduras 2001) has 
                                                 
4 Government of Honduras (2001) estimated that international aid related to reconstruction reached 
US$ 2,769 million.
5 Although these levels were no different from other Central American countries (except in Costa Rica, 
where they were markedly lower), Honduras was the only country in the region where dissatisfaction 
with democracy had steadily grown since first recorded in 1996.  
 
  10gone a long way to show a clear link between values of respect of the law, democratic 
participation and intolerance to corruption, and national development.  
Another factor that makes Honduras an interesting case is the availability of 
the 2001 Transparency and Corruption Survey, or TCS (Seligson 2001). The survey is 
a source of information on social, political and cultural values, perceptions and 
behaviour. Some 3,000 households all over the country were asked in 2001 about 
their tolerance towards corruption, and their levels of trust in public institutions, the 
judiciary, private enterprises, the military, the church and non-governmental 
organisations. Individuals were asked about their perceptions of prevailing corruption 
in these institutions, as well as their political preferences and ideology; they were also 
asked about their trust in individuals—in concrete terms, whether they believed that 
fellow citizens would take advantage of them in difficult times and whether others 
would help them if needed. Although the TCS did not collect information on 
associational life and participation in networks, it did ask about participation in local 
councils meetings (cabildos abiertos) and in other forms of social auditing in the 
community. Interviewees were also asked about their religious beliefs. In terms of 
economic welfare, the TCS reported on households’ access to public services and 
their incomes, in the form of income brackets, but failed to capture information on 
expenditures, productive equipment, land or any asset other than consumer durables. 
Neither did it provide information on strategies to cope with shocks, or on service 
provision profiles within the community. Appendix 1 presents in detail the original 
information from the TCS, and the variables created for the purposes of this analysis.  
 
4.2  The distribution of trust and community participation in Honduras  
Table 3 below shows the rates of trust of individuals and levels of community 
management participation (cabildos abiertos), grouped together in an index. This 
composite admittedly falls short of a proper social capital proxy, as the TCS fails to 
capture explicitly associational life and networking. However, it is believed to 
represent critical aspects of social capital (such as trust and participation) along the 
lines emphasised by Fukuyama (1995). A feature of the estimates for Honduras is that 
households with more unsatisfied basic needs (UBNs) report higher levels of 
  11interpersonal trust and participation in community management.
6
  This result is 
consistent with the aforementioned studies of associationism and household welfare at 
the community level. Households headed by males and households located in rural 
areas have also higher levels of the composite than female-headed and urban 
households.
7 As expected, bad experiences in the post-Mitch reconstruction phase, 
and perceptions that reconstruction funds were mismanaged significantly reduce 
individual trust and community management participation. In contrast, individuals 
with higher perceptions of good governance and institutional trust also score higher in 
the individual trust and participation composite. Preference for democracy is 
associated with higher levels of the composite, although the intensity with which 
democracy is preferred over authoritarian regimes does not significantly affect trust or 
participation.  This result also reflects the fact that a considerable proportion of 
respondents (35 percent) indicated a ‘weak’ preference for democracy (that is, a 
preference for democratic over authoritarian regimes) but also considered basic living 
conditions more important than majority rule. Not surprisingly, higher perception of 
widespread corruption correlates with lower levels of trust and participation among 
Hondurans. The same negative relation is found when individuals believe that fellow 
citizens would not help them in case of need and/or would take advantage of them 
whenever there is an opportunity. Interestingly, being intolerant to corruption is 
associated with higher levels of social capital but this association is not statistically 
significant. There may be several reasons for this, including the almost universal 
acceptance   among   Hondurans   that  corruption  is  a  generalised  practise,  and  the 
                                                 
6 The Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBNs) variable is constructed from information on household access to 
drinkable water, electricity, and floor material. This is only a partial index of basic needs as defined by 
the national Human Development Reports. However, the TCS survey reports neither the household size 
nor the number of rooms, so that crowdedness in the household cannot be included in the UBN 
calculation. Educational attainment is excluded from the definition of UBN because it is used in the 
estimations as a proxy for household human capital. See appendix 2.  
7 These results do not necessarily indicate that females or urban residents have less interest or commit-
ment in community participation. It is more likely that women participate less in council meetings and 
social audit activities than men in order to fulfil their ‘duties’ of reproductive and productive chores. 
Also, individuals may find easier to participate in council meetings in small communities than in larger 
urban communities. In the latter, representation is usually delegated to some members of the commu-
nity.  
  12 imprecise formulation of the question capturing tolerance to corruption.
8  
Levels of ideological radicalism are not associated with large differences in 
interpersonal trust or community participation. In contrast, different religious values 
do lead to a marked variation. Evangelists seem to trust people less than other 
religions and participate less in social control mechanisms. The reasons for this are 
unclear, but it might be the case that Evangelists prefer to participate in their own 
religious associations even when these are not part of the local community, as 
reported for Burkina Faso by Grootaert et al. (2002).  
TABLE 3 
The distribution of trust and community management participation in Honduras 
 






Personal and household characteristics   
Education (years of schooling)    
A. 0-3   33.68  [A-B] 2.91** 
B. 4-9   30.97  [B-C] –3.89** 
C. 10+   35.87  [A-C] –1.60 
Gender of head     
A. Male   34.09  [A-B] 4.02** 
B. Female   30.75   
Location     
A. Urban   30.43  [A-B]  -4.16** 
B. Rural   33.93   
Unsatisfied Basic Needs     
A. 0   31.36  [A-B] –1.82 
B. 1   33.41  [B-C] –0.71 
C. 2+   34.31  [A-C] –2.90** 
Mitch aftermaths    
Perception of mismanagement during Mitch 
A. There was no/little mismanagement   35.12  [A-B] 5.18** 
B. There was a lot of mismanagement    30.72   
Perception of reconstruction efforts     
A. Bad reconstruction   30.99  [A-B] –2.81** 
B. Fair or good reconstruction   33.38   
Political values    
Preference for democracy     
A. Preference for order and authority   30.95  [A-B] –2.36** 
B. Weak preference for democracy   33.78  [B-C] 0.01 
C. Strong preference for democracy   33.77  [A-C] –3.03** 
Ideology     
A. Moderate (4,5,6 in a 1-10 scale)   33.04  [A-B] 1.32 
B. Radical  (1,2,3, 7, 8, 9, 10)   31.70   
                                                 
8 The TCS inquired about the degree of intolerance (none, weak, strong) to eleven acts of corruption, 
from the private use of a public car to bribing politicians: see Appendix 1. Individuals who claim to be 
strongly intolerant to high-level corruption (such as bribes to politicians) may not feel so strongly about 
low-level acts of corruption such as students giving presents to teachers. If that is the case, tolerance to 
low-level corruption may balance out intolerance to high-level corruption. This averaging may result in 
a less sensitive measurement of tolerance to corruption.   
 
  13Perception of good governance     
A. Weak   31.37  [A-B] –1.96* 
B. Moderate   33.11  [B-C] –0.75 
C. Strong   34.13  [A-C] –1.97* 
Trust in institutions     
A. No/little trust    30.78  [A-B] –4.68** 
B. Fair or strong trust   34.29   
Social values    
Perception of corruption     
A. Weak   29.29  [A-B] –1.84* 
B. Moderate   32.05  [B-C] –2.03** 
C. Strong   33.86  [A-C] –3.05** 
Would neighbour help in case of need?    
A. No   30.63  [A-B] –8.50** 
B. Yes   39.22   
    
Would neighbour take advantage when possible? 
A. No   40.61  [A-B] –9.50** 
B. Yes   30.42   
Tolerance to corruption     
A. No   32.72  [A-B] 1.03 
B. Yes   31.77   
Religious values    
A. None   30.67  [A-B] –1.67 
B. Catholic   33.30  [B-C] 2.08** 
C. Evangelist   30.87  [C-D] –1.98* 
D. Other   40.00  [A-D] –1.85 
Source: Author’s estimates from Transparency and Corruption Survey  (Seligson 2001).  
Note: Definitions as indicated in Appendix 1. T-test statistics permit testing of null hypotheses of no statistical 
differences between the means of the trust and community participation index among different categories. 
Pairing of t-tests are indicated with letters A to D. (**) indicates that the null hypothesis of no mean differences 
is rejected at 1% level; (*) indicates that the null hypothesis of no mean differences is rejected at 5% level; 
otherwise, the null hypothesis of no mean differences is accepted, that is, the means are statistically equal for the 
pair considered. The national average of the trust and participation composite is 32.44, and the national average 
of UBNs, 0.72.  
 
4.3  The impact of trust and community participation on economic welfare  
A first (empirical) difficulty in quantifying the relation between trust, 
community participation and economic development is to find an operational concept 
of economic development relevant at the household level. Unsatisfied basic needs 
(UBNs) are selected as this preferred indicator. The choice of this welfare 
measurement is partially explained by data restrictions (deficiencies in the reporting 
of incomes and the absence of information on expenditures and wealth in the TCS), 
but it is also applicable because of benefits specific to UBNs.
9 A second 
(methodological) caveat is a potential simultaneous relation between trust and 
                                                 
9 In practise, the use of UBNs is subject to lower measurement errors than income or expenditure. 
UBNs are less likely to fluctuate over time than expenditures and, especially, incomes. Also, this 
welfare indicator is in line with current efforts to capture the multidimensional nature of welfare 
beyond the standard money metrics.
  14participation, and welfare levels. After all, community management participation has 
an opportunity cost. If a mutual relation exists, it is necessary to isolate the effect of 
trust and participation on welfare from the effect of welfare on trust and participation.  
A well-known econometric technique, Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS), allows for 
the unbiased estimation of a simultaneous relation. In such cases, 3SLS produces 
unbiased, consistent and (asymptotically) efficient estimates (Kmenta 1986: 699). The 
estimation of a simultaneous equation model is discussed in appendix 2.   
Specification tests in table 4 confirm the presence of a simultaneous relation 
and show that 3SLS is preferred over alternative estimation techniques. Honduran 
estimates also indicate a significant and positive effect of households’ trust and 
community participation on their welfare levels: higher levels of trust and community 
participation are associated with fewer UBNs in the household (see the UBN equation 
in table 4).  
TABLE 4  







(average variation in 
the number of 
household  UBNs) 
Determinants of the Trust and 
Community Participation 
Composite   
Effects on the Index of 
Trust and Community 
Participation (% variation  
in the index, 0-100) 
Years of schooling      -5.64**  Unsatisfied Basic Needs    7.50 ** 
Catholic 
(practising)    0.62  Perception of corruption    -7.05 ** 
Catholic (not  
practising)     0.01 
Perception of 
mismanagement of Mitch 
funds   
 -0.55 ** 
Evangelist     -0.01  Perception of neighbour’s help    0.96 ** 
Other religion    0.05  Belief that people will not take 
advantage of others in need    1.81 ** 
Trust and 
community 
participation index   
  -5.62**  Trust in institutions   0.02 
Tegucigalpa     -0.49 **  Democratic values    1.92  ** 
San Pedro Sula     -0.45** 
Degree of ideological 
radicalism   -0.15 
Departmental 
capital      -0.13 **  Political bias   -3.01 
Municipality capital      -1.61 **  Exposure to the media     3.87 ** 
Other city      -0.67 **  Age     0.00** 
Number of children  0.47  Gender (female as reference)  -2.43 ** 
Bad post-Mitch 
reconstruction     4.28**      
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Test   Chi2 Statistic (14)  Ho: Both specifications are statistically identical 
Hausman Test of 3SLS 
vs. 2SLS   14.38 **  Ho Rejected. 3SLS is more efficient a specification 
than 2SLS  
Hausman Test of 3SLS 
vs. OLS  
-18.68 **  Ho Rejected. 3SLS is more efficient a specification 
than OLS  
 
Source: Author's estimates of equations (5) and (6) using Transparency and Corruption Survey  (Seligson, 2001).    
Notes: Effects estimated as re-scaled elasticities, that is, the % impact on UBN and the trust and community 
participation index, respectively, due to changes of 10% in independent variables.  (**) indicates that the estimate 
is significantly different from 0 at 1% level and (*) at 5%.   
   
Given the deficiencies of public service provision (water, sanitation, electricity), 
community participation and informal alliances may well prove decisive in gaining 
and maintaining access to such services. Local water councils (juntas vecinales de 
agua), for example, participate actively in the management of drinking water services 
in municipalities across the country. Furthermore, urban location of the household 
decreases the expected number of its UBNs, surely reflecting a deficit of 
infrastructure and basic service provision in rural areas. Wherever post-Mitch 
reconstruction efforts are perceived to be unsatisfactorily, households report higher 
UBNs. Human capital (proxied by household head’s years of schooling) has the 
expected negative and significant coefficient on UBNs: the more educated the 
household head, the fewer UBNs are found in that household. In contrast, religious 
values do not affect welfare levels: differences in household UBNs are independent of 
their members’ religious values. Interestingly, evidence in Honduras does not support 
Weber’s hypothesis of superior religious values. On the other hand, higher household 
UBNs are associated with higher levels of trust and participation (See the trust and 
participation equation in table 4). Social and political values have the anticipated 
effect on trust and participation. A low perception of corruption is associated with 
higher trust and participation in community management. Similarly, individual 
perceptions of neighbours’ willingness to help in difficult times and the belief that 
fellow citizens would not take advantage of the needy have significant and positive 
effects on trust and participation. Preferences for democracy over authoritarian 
regimes affect positively and significantly the accumulation of trust and participation 
in community management. On the other hand, bad post-Mitch reconstruction 
experiences have a significant but negative bearing on current levels of the trust and 
participation composite. Having controlled for these effects, other social values are 
not found to be statistically significant determinants of the composite. This is the case 
  16for the degree of ideological radicalism, political bias, and institutional trust. It is 
likely that the perception of corruption already captures the effect that such values and 
attitudes may have on the trust and participation composite. Age and gender have 
significant effects on social capital, although the magnitude of the positive age effect 
is negligible. The result for gender does not necessarily mean that women have lower 
interest in participation (although they report systematically lower levels of trust than 
men). It is more likely that this coefficient reflects the well-documented gender 
division of household chores in Latin America and elsewhere (Jejeebhoy 1995). Even 
when there is evidence – see Correia (2001) – that families in Honduras and 
Nicaragua increased the income-generating role of females in the post-Mitch 
reconstruction period, their participation in community activities did not follow suit.  
As for the magnitudes of these effects, differences in household welfare levels 
are the single most important determinant of trust and community management 
participation. An increase of 10 percent in the welfare index leads to an increase in the 
trust and participation index of 7.5 percent. In turn, a 10 percent increase in the trust 
and participation composite increases welfare levels by 5.6 percent. Notwithstanding 
different definitions used, the magnitude of this effect in Honduras is remarkably 
close to the estimated effects reported for Burkina Faso by Grootaert et al. (2002). In 
Honduras, the effects of human capital, on the one hand, and trust and participation, 
on the other, upon household welfare are similar. This contrasts with smaller human 
capital effects reported consistently for Burkina Faso, Indonesia and Bolivia. Quality 
considerations apart, average years of education for an adult household member in 
those countries are lower than in Honduras.
10 This suggests that, in contrast to 
Fukuyama’s argument that social capital cannot be invested in, strengthening trust and 
community participation may well become a rational strategy for households in an 
unfavourable position to accumulate human capital when opportunities are unequal.   
   
5 CONCLUSIONS   
A critical review of economicist and culturalist paradigms shows that the 
developmental role attributed to culture in general, and to specific values, beliefs, and 
behaviours in particular, has fluctuated between two extremes, from complete neglect 
                                                 
10 The figures are 0.7 years in Burkina Faso, 3.9 in Bolivia, 4.8 in Indonesia and 5.7 in Honduras; see 
Grootaert et al. (2002) and UNDP (2003a). 
  17to claims of explanatory superiority. If the ability of these latter claims to go beyond 
isolated successful episodes and to explain the dynamics of economic development is 
rather poor, the lack of supporting evidence is even more disappointing. Less 
ambitious theses, however, have shown more convincingly that specific values of 
trust and civic, participatory and associational behaviours have a significant impact on 
national economic development and community welfare. This study has also 
confirmed that specific cultural aspects may well have a positive and significant 
impact on economic development. In Honduras, interpersonal trust and participation 
in community management are strong determinants of household economic welfare, 
together with geographical location, human capital or the degree of devastation and 
reconstruction following Hurricane Mitch. At the same time, lower household welfare 
is significantly associated with higher interpersonal trust and community management 
participation. Developing informal networks based on trust and community 
participation thus seems to be a rational strategy when formal channels are not 
operating and social opportunities are not uniformly available.    
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  20APPENDICES 
Appendix 1  
Transparency and Corruption Survey (TCS): definitions and descriptives  
Variables   Definition   Values   Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Unsatisfied Basic 
Needs   
Number of household UBNs, 
defined as lack of drinkable water 
and electricity, and having earth 
floor in the household residence.     
From 0 to 3   0.722      0.962  
Social Capital   Index averaging three sub-indexes 
of participation in open council 
meetings; participation in social 
audits and other social control 
mechanisms; and trust in people.    
From 0 to 100   32.44   22.8  
Education   Schooling years   From 0 to 18   5.755         3.224  
Age   Age    From 18 to 97   38.6       14.4  
Gender    Male or female    0 for males; 1 for 
females   
0.496   0.500  
Catholic  
(practising)  
Individual reports to practise the 
catholic faith.   
1 for practising 
catholics; 0, 
otherwise  
0.391   0.488  
Catholic  
(not practising)   
Individual reports to be a non-
practising catholic.   
1 for non-practising 
catholics; 0, 
otherwise.   
0.232   0.422  
Evangelist   Individual reports to be Evangelist.   1 for evangelists; 0, 
otherwise.  
0.281   0.449  
Other religion   Individual reports to profess 
religions other than Catholicism 
and Evangelism.   
1 for professing 
other religion; 0, 
otherwise.   
0.008   0.091  
No religion   Individual reports not to profess 
any religion.  
1 for unreligious 
individuals; 0, 
otherwise.  
0.079   0.270  
Tegucigalpa   Household location in Tegugicalpa.  1 for residents in 
Tegucigalpa; 0 for 
residents 
elsewhere.   
0.041   0.199  
San Pedro Sula   Household location in San Pedro 
Sula.  
1 for residents in 
San Pedro; 0 for 
residents 
elsewhere.   
0.041   0.199  
Departmental  
capital   
Household location in 
departmental capital other than 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro.  
1 for residents in 
departmental 
capitals other than 
Tegucigalpa and 
San Pedro; 0 for 
residents 
elsewhere.   
0.075   0.263  
Municipal capital   Household location in a municipal 
capital.   
1 for residents in 
municipal capitals; 
0 for residents 
elsewhere.   
0.250   0.433  
Other cities   Household location in cities other 
than the previous.  
1 for residents in 
other cities; 0, for 
residents 
elsewhere.  
0.016   0.128  
Rural    Household location in rural areas.    1 for residents in 
rural areas; 0 for 
residents 
elsewhere.   
0.575   0.494  
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Variables   Definition   Values   Mean   Standard 
deviation  
Number of 
children in the 
household   
Number of children in the 
household.   






Perception index on financial 
mismanagement of post-Mitch 
reconstruction funds in the 
community in which the 
interviewee lives.  Original values 
in the 2001 Transparency and 
Corruption Survey are: 1 if funds 
were correctly managed; 2, if the 
management was ‘somewhat’ 
satisfactory; 3, if funds were 
inappropriately managed; 4, if 
funds were completely 
mismanaged.    
From 0 to 100.   
100 reflects a 
perception of totally 
mismanaged 
reconstruction 
funds.   
60.9   48.8  
Deficient post- 
Mitch  
reconstruction    
Perception index on the outcome 
of the reconstruction process. 
Answers in the 2001 Transparency 
and Corruption Survey account for 
a completely satisfactory 
reconstruction; a somewhat 
satisfactory reconstruction; 
inappropriate reconstruction; a 
completely deficient 
reconstruction.    
From 0 to 100.   
100 reflects that 
reconstruction was 
completely 
deficient.   
57.3   21.3  
Perception of 
corruption 
Index averaging the level of 
corruption perceived by 
interviewees regarding the 
following institutions and 
individuals: Congress members; 
ministers; majors; municipal 
council members; police officers; 
teachers; university professors; 
civil society leaders; bank 
managers; customs officers. 
From 0 to 100.   







corruption   
Index on the degree of tolerance 
reported by interviewees regarding 
the following acts: Congress 
member accepts a bribe from a 
firm; firm bribes a Congress 
member; a student gives a gift to a 
teacher; a teacher accepts a gift 
from a student; a civil servant uses 
a public car for his/her holidays; a 
civil servant does not report that 
another makes private use of a 
public car; a major lends a 
municipal tractor after receiving 
money on his own account; a 
mother bribes a public employee to 
obtain a birth certificate; a public 
employee accepts a bribe to issue 
birth certificate; a firm alters 
market prices; an individual uses 
connections to get a job. Tolerance 
levels before such acts include the 
following answers: such acts are 
corrupt and should be punished; 
such acts are corrupt but justified; 
such acts are not corrupt.    
From 0 to 100.   
100 represent a 
complete tolerance 
to corrupt acts.   
45.1   12.1  
 
  22Variables   Definition     Mean   Standard 
deviation  
Good 
Governance   
Perception index on the 
willingness of politicians to respect 
law, their zeal for equality in the 
application of law; their interest in 
the development of the country; 
the extent to which Congress 
represents people’s interest; the 
degree of efficiency of the 
judiciary.   
From 0 to 100.   
100 represents a 
complete 
recognition of good 
governance.   
29.8   16.0  
Belief that 
neighbours would 
help if they could.  
This variable indicates whether 
individuals believe that fellow 
citizens only care for themselves, 
or, rather, they typically help 
others.    
From 0 to 100.   
100 represent the 
belief that people 
are always willing 
to help others.   




someone in case 
of  need.   
This variable indicates whether 
individuals believe that most 
people would take advantage of 
others in need.     
From 0 to 100.   
100 reflects the 
belief that people 
never  take 
advantage of 
others in need.   
19.8    39.8  
Trust in 
instittutions   
Index on the degree of trust toward 
the following institutions: the 
judiciary; political parties; 
politicians; National Electoral 
Tribunal; the military; the 
Congress; the government; the 
Comptroller; the Ministry of 
Finance; the police; the church; the 
media; municipalities; trade 
unions; and NGOs. Trust is 
measured on a scale from zero to 
seven, where seven reflects 
maximum trust.     
From 0 to 100.   
100 reflects 
complete trust in 
institutions.   
46.7    17.9  
Preference for 
democracy  
Index of preference for democracy. 
A strong preference is considered 
when individuals both prefer 
democracy over authoritarian 
regimes in all circumstances and 
consider that a participatory 
system is more democratic than 
others, ensuring a lifeline level of 
welfare. A weak preference is 
attributed to individuals 
simultaneously preferring 
democracy over authoritarianism 
and a lifeline level of welfare over 
participation. Finally, individuals 
who prefer authoritarian regimes 
over democracy are considered to 
have no preference for democracy.   




regimes; 1 a weak 
preference for 
democracy; and 2, 
a strong preference 
for democracy.   
0.672      0.736  
Ideological 
radicalism   
This variable identifies whether an 
individual has a radical ideology 
(either leftist or rightist). A radical 
ideological position fares one to 
three, or seven to ten in a scale 
from one to ten. Someone 
reporting to pertain to the 
intermediate position (four to six) in 
the ideological scale is considered 
ideologically moderate.    
1 for radicalism; 0 
for moderate 
ideologies.   
0.635   0.481  
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Political bias    Index measuring the degree of 
dispersion from the nation-wide 
average rate of approval for former 
President Flores (1998-2001).   
From 0 to 100.   
100 represents the 
largest deviation to 
the nation-wide 
average rate of 
approval to former 
President Flores.    
24.3   17.4  
Exposure to the 
media 
Index on the exposure to the 
media, according to whether 
individuals are in the habit of 
reading the press, listening to radio 
or watching TV news. 
From 0 to 100.   
100 indicates a full 
exposure to the 
press, radio and 
TV. 
58.8 33.6 
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Measuring the effects of social capital on household UBNs 
  
A well-known econometric technique, Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS), 
allows for the estimation of the simultaneous relation of two variables. In the case of 
an endogenous relation between two variables and correlations between their error 
terms, the 3SLS technique is preferred to alternative estimating techniques such as 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS). In such cases, 
3SLS estimates are unbiased, consistent and (asymptotically) efficient (Kmenta 
1986). The challenge remains to find good instruments for the trust and participation 
composite. Individuals’ perceptions of corruption, trust in institutions, political 
values, and exposure to the media, are believed to be strongly associated with levels 
of trust and participation without influencing the level of welfare. It is difficult to 
argue that an individual’s preference for democracy systematically affects her access 
to sanitation, for instance. However, exclusion from public services may be expected 
to shape her political preferences as well as her trust in the government, the political 
system, and her participatory behaviour in community decision-making.  
The 3SLS technique firstly sets a system of structural simultaneous equations 
for UBNs and the trust and participation in community management (TP) index and 
all other independent variables, V, X and Z:  
UBN = F (TP, X, Z)  (1) 
 
TP= F (UBN, V, X, Z)  (2) 
where ‘TP’ represents both the individual’s trust in people and the degree of 
community participation; ‘V’ includes values, attitudes, and perceptions that affect the 
trust and participation composite without affecting the individual’s welfare; ‘X’ refers 
to personal characteristics such as gender, age, and education of the household head; 
‘Z’ refers to household characteristics such as composition or localisation. Appendix 
1 above presents a detailed definition of these variables.  
Secondly, 3SLS estimates a two reduced-equation system in which both 
dependent variables (UBNs and TP) are regressed on all independent variables:   
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UBN = F (V, X, Z)  (3) 
 
TP    = F (V, X, Z)  (4) 
The estimation of these reduced equations (3) and (4) adjusts the original 
distribution of UBNs and TP, obtaining corrected distributions for such variables, as 
well as a full-information matrix of variance and covariance for the error terms of the 
UBNs and TP equations. The newly estimated endogenous variables and error 
variance and covariance matrix are used in the third and final step of the 3SLS 
procedure to estimate a corrected simultaneous system for UBN and 
^ ^
TP : 




As indicated above, the superiority of the 3SLS technique over OLS and 2SLS 
estimations needs be checked. Implicitly, the specification test for the preferred 
technique is equivalent to testing for the presence of endogeneity and error 
correlation. Hausman’s specification tests will determine the consistent efficient 
specification.   
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 3SLS estimates of the coefficients of UBN and TP equations  
UBN Equation    TP  Equation 
Explanatory variables  Coefficients  
(Std. Errors) 
 Explanatory  variables  Coefficients  
(Std. Errors) 
Education  
(years of schooling)   
-0.063**  
(0.006)  
  Unsatisfied Basic Needs       0.072**  
   (0.018)  
Catholic  
(practising)  
 0.102  
    (0.081)  
  Perception of corruption     -  0.103**  
  (0.044)  
Catholic  
(not practising)   
 0.004  
(0.085)  
  Perception of mismanagement of 
Mitch funds   
  -0.027*  
  (0.011)  
Evangelist    -0.004  
(0.084)  
  Perception of neighbour’s help         0.039**  
  (0.014)  
Other religion    0.450  
    (0.248)  
  Belief that people will not take 
advantage of others in need   
    0.071**  
 (0.014)  
Trust and community 
participation index  
    -1.162**  
(0.353  
  Trust in institutions   0.003  
(0.036)  
Tegucigalpa   -0.769**  
(0.118)  
  Democratic values      0.014*  
(0.007)  
San Pedro Sula       -0.672**  
(0.108)  
  Degree of ideological radicalism      -0.015  
(0.011)  
Province capital    -0.662**  
(0.086)  
  Political bias      -0.054  
(0.031)  
Municipality capital    -0.431**  
(0.049)  
  Exposure to the media        0.130**  
 (0.025)  
Other city    -0.563**  
(0.168)  
  Age        0.002**  
   (0.0003)  
Number of children    0.009  
    (0.007)  
  
  Gender (Female as reference)    -0.024*  
 (0.010)  
Insufficient post-Mitch 
reconstruction  
 0.504 **  
    (0.098)  
  
  Constant       0.113**  
 (0.044)  
Constant    1.298 **  
(0.152)  
       
             
N. Observations     1852    N. Observations    1852  
Specification Test: 
Chi2  
413.9 **    Specification Test: Chi2      152.5**  
R2         0.2780     R2         0.1008  
Source: Author’s estimates of equations (5) and (6) using Transparency and Corruption Survey  (Seligson, 2001)  
Notes: Effects estimated as re-scaled elasticities, that is, the % impact on UBN and the trust and community 
participation index, respectively, due to changes of 10% in independent variables.  (**) indicates that the estimate  
is significantly different from 0 at a 99% interval of confidence and (*) at a 95%
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